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CLASS ACT: CONSIDERING RACE AND
GENDER IN THE CORPORATE
BOARDROOM
JANIS SARRAt
INTRODUCTION-PROLOGUE
Canadians tend to pride themselves on their superior
corporate governance, accountability, and the notable absence of
scandals of the magnitude of Enron, WorldCom, or Adelphia.
The premise is that principles-based governance is more effective
than a rules-based paradigm, and that directors and officers are
likely to be more accountable to investors and others where they
truly embrace key principles of effective governance. The
hallmarks of effective oversight by corporate directors include:
independence, integrity, and commitment to ethics; effective
oversight of managers; strategic planning initiatives, including
ongoing assessment of risks; separation of CEO and board chair
or the creation of a lead director position; clearly articulated
directorial duties; in-camera meetings solely of independent
directors; well-defined board committees with independent
directors; ongoing evaluation of individual director and board
performance; clear mandates; and transparent and accountable
reporting structures. Best practice suggests that the majority of
directors on any given board should be independent and
committed to giving sufficient time to the board in order to
ensure effective monitoring and oversight.' Yet a board can have
f Associate Dean and Associate Professor, University of British Columbia,
Faculty of Law, Vancouver, Canada. My thanks to Caley Howard, UBC Law II, for
research assistance.
1 The Toronto Stock Exchange ("TSX") defines "unrelated directors" as:
[D]irector[s] [that are] independent of management and [are] free from any
interest and any business or other relationship which could, or could
reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director's ability to
act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, other than interests
and relationships arising from shareholding[s].
TORONTO STOCK EXCH., COMPANY MANUAL § 474(2) (2005), http://www.tsx.com/en/
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all of these traits and still not be maximizing value if the
corporation is paying for costly litigation to defend discrimination
complaints, has lower productivity due to problems of systemic
discrimination, or is facing a loss of consumer goodwill because of
a reputation for gender and/or race discrimination.
Canadian publicly traded corporations, for the most part,have human rights policies and proactive programs to redressboth overt and systemic discrimination, and Canada has not
experienced the same level of egregious behavior in respect to sex
and race discrimination exhibited by some U.S. corporations. 2
Yet race and gender discrimination continue to persist.3 In
Ontario alone there were 735 complaints regarding race and
color to the Ontario Human Rights Commission in 2004-2005,
67% of which were workplace related; comprising 30% of all
complaints under the Ontario Human Rights Code. 4 There were668 complaints in relation to sex and pregnancy, and 209
complaints of sexual harassment during the same period, 90%
and 93%, respectively, involved employment discrimination.5
There continue to be serious problems encountered by women
and persons of color in their advancement in corporations,
particularly at the highest managerial and directorship levels.6
pdf/CompanyManual.pdf.
2 See, e.g., CGI, FUNDAMENTAL TEXTS: CODE OF ETHICS 59-60, available at
http://www.cgi.com/cgi/pdf/cgi-gouvern funtext chap4_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 28,2005) (explaining the Canadian company's policy on discrimination); SCOTIABANK,GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESS CONDUCT 26 (1997), available athttp://www.scotiabank.com/images/en/filesaboutscotia/8
5 98 .pff (indicating that
"[t]he Bank will not tolerate any behavior.., that conflicts with the spirit or theintent of the Canadian Human Rights Act or other human rights and anti-discrimination laws that apply to subsidiaries, or to the Bank's operations outside ofCanada"); Shell Can., Code of Ethics, available at http://www.shell.ca/code
values/commitments/ethics.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (noting that
"discrimination in the workplace will not be tolerated"); see also Cheryl L. Wade,Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and RaceDiscrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1464-66 (2002) (recognizing the continued
race discrimination that endures in large corporations).
3 See Wade, supra note 2, at 1464.
4 ONT. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, at 69 (2005),
available at http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/publications/2004.2005_annual.
report 1 .shtml#_Toc106509093 [hereinafter ONT. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N].
5 Id.
6 See Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can TitleVII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1517,1526-27 (1995) (explaining that Title VII has not had the same level of success ineliminating discrimination at higher levels of employment as it has at lower levelswithin organizations); see also Tracy Anbinder Baron, Keeping Women Out of the
1122
2005] 1123RACE AND GENDER IN THE BOARDROOM
Discrimination often operates subconsciously or with little
transparency, even where human rights programs are in place,
creating an even greater challenge for effective governance. This
Article considers how corporate boards and their current
representation and practice perpetuate these problems through
their own lack of diversity. It suggests that the issues touch not
only on gender and race, but also on class, in the manner in
which board selection and practice occurs in the Canadian
corporate environment.
In the United States, Cheryl Wade has suggested that
racially toxic corporate activity and the lack of board oversight of
human rights compliance has led to enormous costs to investors
from loss of civil anti-discrimination suits.
7 There have been
several significant racial discrimination class action suits
including those against Texaco, which paid $176.1 million, and
Coca-Cola, which paid $192.5 million, to settle racial
discrimination litigation.8 Wade notes that absent diversity on
boards, the ability to empathize on gender and race issues is
problematic for directors where their work and social experiences
do not instill empathy for the particular group alleging
discrimination.9 Steven Ramirez has observed that race imposes
billions of dollars in macroeconomic costs annually on U.S.
society.10
Executive Suite: The Court's Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 267 & n.1 (1994) (discussing the phenomenon called the
"glass ceiling" that explains why women and people of color are disproportionately
under-represented in higher level positions).
7 See Cheryl L. Wade, The Interplay Between Securities Regulation and
Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism, the Shareholder Proposal Rule, and
Corporate Compliance with Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS 156, 163 (Janis Sarra ed., 2003).
8 See Wade, supra note 2, at 1463. The companies also agreed to change their
employment practices in respect to workers of color, and to implement monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms. Id.
9 See id. at 1479-80. Wade has suggested that there is a role for empathy in
corporate governance, and points to both judicial use of the business judgment rule
to reflect empathy with directors in terms of the difficulties of corporate decision
making and empathy used by special board committees assessing requests for
derivative actions for alleged corporate wrongdoing as evidence that empathetic
behavior already exists. Id. at 1479.
10 See Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in
the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837, 839-41
(2003) (explaining how non-diverse boards submissively allowed executives to
accumulate billions in options compensation, while the companies they were
managing went bankrupt, and suggesting that cultural diversity on boards is 
a
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Unlike the United Sates, Canadian corporate boards do notface costly civil suit damages for race and gender discrimination,
as the human rights statutes in Canada are considered to be a
"comprehensive system" of remedial human rights legislation.11
The courts have prohibited civil suits where a comprehensive
remedial scheme exists. 12 At least in principle, complainants
have cost-effective access to enforcement of their rights, with
human rights commissions having carriage of claims and bearing
the cost of enforcement. The vast majority of human rights cases
are settled through mediation and conciliation. For example, in
Ontario in 2004-2005, the remedies paid from settled claims
were a total of $1,003,742 for race and color complaints, an
average of $6,922 per person; and $575,437 to settle sexualharassment complaints, an average of $7,018 per person
complaining.13 Some human rights legislation also has a cap on
non-pecuniary damages, such as humiliation or other harm. 14
Corporations that engage in gender and race discrimination
will face the costs of litigation, possible reputational sanction,
potential consumer boycotts, and the cost of remedies that place
the individual complainant in the position she or he would havebeen in but for the discrimination. Yet the kinds of large
means to combat these problems).
11 See Joseph M. Kelly & Bob Watt, Damages in Sex Harassment Cases: AComparative Study of American, Canadian, and British Law, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 79, 132 (1996) ("[T]he levels of compensation awarded by theCanadian ... courts [were] much lower than ... U.S. decisions"); Gaby 0r6-Aguilar,Sexual Harassment and Human Rights in Latin America, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 631,643-44 & n.81 (1997) (comparing the effects of human rights statutes in Canada, theUnited States, and Britain).
12 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.1, 20, 28 (1980) (acknowledging that a comprehensive remedial scheme developed byCongress evidences a decision to preclude other remedies); Kilvitis v. County ofLuzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 419 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that the Family andMedical Leave Act evinced Congress's intent to foreclose a § 1983 action); Desrochersv. Hilton Hotels Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (D. Mass. 1998). Generally, there arefewer class actions in Canada than the United States because, until recently,
contingency fees were prohibited under the public policy of champerty. Moreover,Canada has a cost allocation system that awards litigation costs to the winner aspart of the remedy, increasing the cost risks associated with bringing civil claims.See John E. Core, The Directors' and Officers' Insurance Premium: An OutsideAssessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 451
n.2 (2000).
13 ONT. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 4, at 70.
14 See Kelly & Watt, supra note 11, at 115 (explaining that under the Human
Rights Code, damage awards for humiliation and/or exemplary damages are capped
at $10,000).
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settlements that corporations in the United States have faced
will not occur in Canada. While costly civil suits are expensive
for the U.S. corporation and its investors, their threat may act as
a normative temper on discriminatory conduct; in turn, serving
to keep corporate boards vigilant in respect of their human rights
practices. Absent that threat, in some cases, sanctions for
human rights violations may be viewed by the corporation as
simply the cost of doing business. On the other hand, even where
there are successful suits in the United States, it can have
negligible impact on share price to serve as a normative temper
on corporate activity.15 A more robust public human rights
system, such as exists in Canada, may foster greater settlement
of claims. Moreover, human rights adjudicators can order
systemic remedies that alter corporate practice.
This Article briefly examines five issues in turn: the
challenges faced in creating more diverse corporate boards; the
potential for the duty of care to encompass monitoring human
rights compliance; the role of shareholders and regulators in
changing current patterns of governance; the issue of how
externalities may disproportionately affect women and persons of
color; and how the multinational nature of firm governance and
activity impacts on the issue of race, gender, and class. As with a
theatre play, the Article touches only the surface of these
questions and does not fully expose the challenges. There are
many complex and critical questions requiring further research
in respect to issues of race, gender, and the corporation.
I. DRAMATIS PERSONAE
16
In Canada, it is difficult to determine whether the issue of
race and gender discrimination is "in the script" of corporate
board planning. In part, this is a function of who is on Canadian
corporate boards. Although there are no precise figures, a recent
survey found that only 7.4% of Canadian corporate board seats
are held by women, with 353 women holding 431 directorships.1
7
15 See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251
(2003) (describing the insignificant effect of suits on firm value because of the
limited effects on stock price and remedial changes that follow the settlements).
16 7 THE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 224 (A.K. Smith, ed., AMS Press 1968)
(1733).
17 CATALYST, PERSPECTIVE 2002: CATALYST TRACKS TRENDS WITH MEMBER
BENCHMARKING SURVEY AND CANADIAN CENSUS (2002), available at
20051
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This is less than half the percentage in the United States and
very well below the 47% participation rate of women in the
Canadian workforce.18 Women working full time continue to
earn only 70.5% the average income of men. 19 Once public sector
enterprises and non-profit corporations are included, women
account for 16% of board members. 20 Yet two in seven Canadian
boards are still all-male. 21 The number of racial minorities on
Canadian boards is unknown, although one limited survey found
that the figure was less than 2%.22 U.S. statistics indicate that
while African Americans and Latinos make up 30% of the U.S.
population, they comprise only 4% of the 11,500 Fortune 1000
corporation directors.23 Approximately 90% of Fortune 1000
senior executives are white men.24  Of thirty-one corporatedirectors holding forty-six directorships in Canadian based
issuers that were surveyed in 2002, 80% identified the need for
more gender diversity on corporate boards and acknowledged
that diversity of views can enhance governance as long as there
is a shared goal of effective governance and a willingness to work
together. 25 Over half of those surveyed advised that there had
been no discussion during their board recruitment process of the
need to attract persons of color to the board. 26
http://www.catalystwomen.orgfbookstore/perspective/april2OO2.pdf
18 See Canadian Statistics, Employment by Age, Sex, Type of Work, Class of
Worker and Provinces (Monthly), http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/labr66a.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2005). In the Unites States women hold 14% of board seats.
Ramirez, supra note 10, at 838.
19 Canadian Statistics, Average Earnings by Sex and Work Pattern (Full-TimeWorkers), http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/labor01b.htm (last visited Oct. 28,2005).
20 DAVID BROWN ET AL., A QUANTUM LEAP: CANADIAN DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES(1997); DAVID BROWN & DEBRA BROWN, SUCCESS IN THE BOARDROOM 4 (1998).
21 BROWN & BROWN, supra note 20.
22 U.B.C. LAW GOVERNANCE SURVEY, 45 BOARDS OF CANADIAN BASED ISSUERS(2002) (on file with author) at 56 [hereinafter U.B.C. LAW GOVERNANCE SURVEY].
23 Ramirez, supra note 10, at 838; Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of
'Corporate Democracy' Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 736 (2003) (explaining that "[p]eople of color make up a growingproportion of corporations' labor force but not of their directorial and executive
class").
24 Ramirez, supra note 10, at 838.
25 Janis Sarra, Oversight, Hindsight and Foresight: Canadian CorporateGovernance Through the Lens of Global Capital Markets, in CORPORATEGOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 7, at 40, 68 (citing UBC LAW
GOVERNANCE SURVEY (2002)).
26 Id.
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In considering the issue of race and gender on Canadian
corporate boards, it merits note that the capital structure of
Canadian corporations differs from the United States, with the
majority of corporations closely held, even when publicly
traded.27 There are a number of publicly traded corporations
that are dominated by family holdings or a small group of
shareholders. 28 The capital structure suggests that the close
control may work to prevent persons of color from accessing
boards, as family members control board membership in a
number of situations. Women have fared slightly better as
daughters and partners of powerful shareholding families,
keeping control and holdings tightly held. There are also forty-
five Canadian based issuers on the S&P/TSX Composite Index
with dual shares structures, providing unequal weighting to the
exercise of share voting power.29 In such circumstances, absent
the controlling shareholders having a commitment to redressing
gender and race discrimination, the composition of these boards
is unlikely to change. Moreover, it is estimated that one third of
the shares of Canadian corporations are now owned by
institutional investors in the form of pension funds, mutual
funds, and independent money managers.30 The rapid growth of
institutional investors in the past two decades has started to
lessen this familial hold on the corporate board; 31 yet
institutional investors for the most part have not championed
board diversity, although they are increasingly measuring
effective governance by a series of factors that includes
compliance with human rights law.
II. RAISING THE CURTAIN ON BOARD COMPOSITION
Good governance practice should be an objective of corporate
boards. There have been numerous studies that show a
27 CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES FOR BUILDING HIGH PERFORMANCE BOARDS 4 (2005), available at
http://www.ccgg.ca/web/ccgg.nsf/web/ccgg-uidelines-vljanuary-2005/$FILE/CCGG
Guidelines vl January2005.pdf [hereinafter CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD
GOVERNANCE].
28 But see id. (indicating a shift in corporate ownership as institutional investors
have acquired significant ownership positions in Canadian publicly traded
corporations).
29 Id.
30 Id; see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 20.
31 CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 27, at 4.
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correlation between effective governance practice, measured by
an active and independent board engaged in stewardship,
monitoring and accountability, and maximizing enterprise
value.32 Strategic planning and an ability to foresee and manage
risk are important governance qualities, and risk management
and planning is enhanced by ensuring a diverse set of
perspectives at the board. The homogeneity of existing directors
creates a barrier to boards being able to fully engage in strategic
planning and risk assessment, given that the lack of diversity in
perspectives means that directors are less likely to be able to
foresee the full range of both upside and downside risks to
corporate decisions. 33
Diversity on the corporate board can enhance corporate
governance, in turn increasing enterprise wealth maximization. 34
The Conference Board of Canada has reported that there are
both practical and symbolic reasons to have diverse boards. 35
Using gender as a proxy for diversity, it conducted a study aimed
at measuring the results of gender diversity on boards. The
Conference Board tracked corporations for six years and found
that boards with two or more women directors in 1995 were far
more likely to be industry leaders in profits six years later.36 It
found that 94% of boards with three or more women explicitly
monitor the implementation of corporate strategy, compared with
66% of all-male boards; 74% of boards with three or more women
explicitly identify criteria for measuring strategy, compared with
45% of all-male boards; and 86% of boards with three or more
women adopted a corporate code of conduct, compared with 66%
of non-diverse boards. 37 Where corporations had three or more
women on the corporate board, the study found that 94% of
boards ensured compliance with internal conflict of interest
32 BROWN & BROWN, supra note 20. See generally Ira M. Millstein & Paul W.
MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly
Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1298-1309 (1998) (discussing the
correlation between board independence and corporate performance as well as
several empirical methods of tracking that statistical relationship).
33 See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
34 See Ramirez, supra note 10, at 839-41, 845-56.
35 See DAVID BROWN ET AL., CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., WOMEN ON BOARDS:
NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING... BUT THE BRIGHT THING (2002), available at
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?rnext=374.
36 Id. at i.
37 Id. at 5-6.
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guidelines compared with 68% of all-male boards. 38 Seventy-two
percent of boards with two or more women conduct formal board
performance evaluation, compared to 49% of all-male boards.
39
These boards are more likely to have formal orientation and
training programs and formal written limits to authority.
Overall, the Conference Board concluded that an increased
number of women on corporate boards is likely to enhance the
oversight and monitoring activities of corporate boards.
40 Its
research found that "[d]iversity on boards ... does change the
functioning and deliberative style of the board in clear and
consistent ways" and that "[g]ood governance improves
organizational performance over the long term, financially and
non-financially. ' 41  Important from an enterprise wealth
maximization perspective, the Conference Board found that 86%
of boards with three or more women have two-way
communication between the corporation and its stakeholders,
compared with 71% of all-male boards.42 It found that women
are more likely to consider measures of innovation, and social
and community responsibility; and that there is a correlation
between women on boards and higher levels of customer and
employee satisfaction. 43  Finally, it concluded that women
directors make a practical difference to the independence and
activism of boards, and are more likely to implement and monitor
the indicia of good governance developed by international
organizations. 44
In Canada, board members are drawn from senior managers
and executives on the basis that they have acquired skills and
experience that allows for oversight. Larger organizations are
more likely to have women directors than smaller organizations,
and 34% of women directors are in the finance sector. 45 While
the Conference Board clearly confirmed linkages between gender
diversity, good governance, and financial performance, the causal
effect was not determinative. The Board has speculated on
38 Id. at 6.
39 Id. at 11.
40 See id. at 11 ("Boards with more women examine a wider range of
management and organizational performance indicators.").
41 Id. at ii.
42 Id. at 13.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 15.
45 Id. at 7.
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whether cause and effect might be in reverse order; specifically,
that more women on boards resulted in more women executives
being hired. The Conference Board found that organizations
with women on their boards in 1995 had 30% more women
executives by 2001 than organizations that had all-male boards
in 1995.46 It also observed that absent adding gender to the list
of skills and qualifications used in choosing new board members,
boards are unlikely to search for and thus find qualified women. 47
There is likely some merit in this observation, as the 7.4%
women directors does not correlate at all with Statistics Canada
reports that women occupy 35% of total management occupations
in Canada.48
The Conference Board research also compared favorably
with U.S. research in indicating that boards with women are
more profitable than similarly situated all-male boards. Those
corporations with all-male boards in 1995 ranked an average of
seventeenth in their industry in terms of profits five years later
compared with corporations with two or more women, which
ranked tenth in their industry. 49 Again, while there are linkages,
the causal connection is less clear. Boards of profitable firms
may be more innovative in their governance practice and hence
more likely to add women to their boards, or, on the other hand,
more women may increase profits. Nevertheless, the Conference
Board concluded that there is a consistent pattern of linkages
between women directors and profits and revenues. 50
The Conference Board statistics merit reflection because
they are one of the few empirical studies in Canada that have
measured both indicia of good governance and financial
performance with gender representation. While it is not a direct
proxy for racial diversity, it clearly establishes linkages between
diversity of perspective, skills and performance, and consumer
and employee satisfaction, themselves frequently viewed as a
46 Id. at 8.
47 See id. at 10.
48 See Canadian Statistics, Experienced Labour Force Fifteen Years and Over
by Occupation and Sex, by Provinces and Territories (2001 Census),
http://www40.statcan.ca/lO1/cstOlflabor45a.htm?sdi=management%20sex (last
visited Oct. 28, 2005) (reporting that women held 574,380 of the total 1,620,900
management occupations in Canada according to the 2001 Census); see also supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
49 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 35, at 12.
50 See id. at i.
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measure of board success. Yet, notwithstanding publication of
these results, the percentage of women corporate directors in
Canada remains extremely low.
A. Interpretation of the Scene
Scholars have observed that many recent corporate scandals
in the United States were a function of group-think, whereby
homogenous boards tended to be unquestioning in their
oversight.5 1 This occurs in part because of social and cultural
ties, and the lack of diversity in outlook and experience that gives
rise to like-mindedness. Given the influence of CEOs over the
board selection process, CEOs are more likely to seek directors
that will not challenge their managerial activity or strategic
planning. In Canada, controlling shareholders are likely to seek
out those related or similarly situated individuals, drawing on
their own social circle and class. Even where there are board
selection committees comprised of independent directors, there is
a tendency to select people that come from the same range of
experiences because they are familiar and reinforce the cultural
norms of the board. While board members require some degree
of compatibility, the creative energy that comes from different
views brought to bear on a decision can be the key to effective
governance. 52 Few boards set detailed criteria of the skills and
experience sought for the board, given the particular markets in
which the corporation operates and other factors that will affect
governance.
The rationale used to exclude women and persons of color
from Canadian boards is that directors require CEO experience.
This is perpetuated by a culture that suggests that this was the
required qualification of existing directors and that new directors
need to "pay their dues." Yet the cyclical effect of this is
apparent: without diversity of views in the corporate boardroom,
women and persons of color are unlikely to be internally
promoted given strong cultural and behavioral norms of hiring
51 Marleen O'Connor has written on the problem of "group-think," where board
homogeneity creates an inability to critically assess the activities of corporate
officers. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003); see also Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and
Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (2002)
("[D]iverse perspectives on corporate boards of directors are likely to improve the
quality of board decision making.").
52 See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
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those who resemble oneself. However, officer experience is only
one of the skills that boards need to attract. If diverse boards do,
as the studies suggest, enhance governance, then Canadian
boards are missing an important opportunity to enhance the
quality of their oversight. 53 Lynne Dallas has proposed relational
corporate boards in which value is added to the corporation by
extending board memberships to diverse groups, thereby
improving access to advice and information, enhancing
monitoring, and reducing environmental uncertainty. 54
Steven Ramirez observes that initiatives under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the extent that director selection
power is shifted from the CEO to independent board members,
creates fewer incentives for those directors to reproduce directors
exactly like themselves and may result in an increase in board
diversity where independent directors recognize the value that
diversity contributes to enhanced governance. 55  The critical
issue is whether independent directors recognize that value. It
may not always be overt discrimination that is of concern, but
rather the losses that can be associated with failing to have more
fulsome representation by gender and race on corporate boards.
Ramirez suggests that it is not skin color that gives rise to
different and valuable insights on boards, but rather that
cultural diversity leads to cognitive skills that can transcend
race, and can lead to deeper thinking and more creative problem
solving skills in conjunction with clearly articulated best
practices. 56 The Conference Board has noted that the term
diversity means more than the promotion of visible diversity, but
means also "invisible" diversity, indicated by a range of different
gifts, skills, experiences, views, and perspectives that individuals
possess. 57 A Canadian survey also found that corporations may
look increasingly at women for board seats post-Enron because of
53 Id.
54 See Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate
Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (1996).
55 See Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory:
Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1583, 1610-11 (2004).
56 Id. at 1611.
57 BROWN ET AL., supra note 35, at i (showing that the Fortune 500 firms with
the best record of promoting women to senior positions, including directorships, are
more profitable, with the twenty-five firms with the best promotion record posting
returns on assets 18% higher and returns on investment 69% higher than the
Fortune 500 median of their industry).
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new requirements for financial literacy, an area in which women
are occupationally represented in accounting and auditing
fields.58  However, women drawn from the ranks of the
accounting profession are not necessarily going to fully address
the issue of diversity in perspectives, where women are drawn
from a class that is not reflective of the rich diversity of gender,
race, and class that is implicated in corporate activity. 59
As with women, even if racially diverse representation on
corporate boards does exist, it still may not reflect the diversity of
perspectives that can enhance governance. Devon Carbado and
Mitu Gulati have suggested that racial minorities at the top of
the U.S. corporate hierarchy will neither racially reform the
corporation nor engage in discrimination-ameliorative
activities. 60 They observe that corporate racism is often designed
to achieve partial, as opposed to total, exclusion of non-whites by
promoting those of color who are considered more palatable to
corporate decision makers. 61 While there are benefits that can
flow from first generation corporate diversity, such as stereotype
negation, racial monitoring and accountability, and positive role-
modeling, Carbado and Gulati suggest that there are strong
incentives within the complicated micro-dynamics of corporate
organizations for persons of color not to act to reduce
discriminatory practices.62 Central to their analysis is the notion
that an employee's ability to climb the corporate hierarchy is
based on more than qualifications and capability, and requires
effective negotiation of the political landscape of the institution,
the ability to make allies with powerful individuals and groups,
and to undermine competitors. 63 They also warn of the risk of
tokenism; specifically, that the cost of any failure reflects on the
particular race, that tokenism may restrict the person's sense of
autonomy, and that there are barriers to being mentored because
58 UBC LAW GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 22.
59 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
60 See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the
Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1645, 1677-91 (2004) (arguing that corporations will only hire minorities that
have perspectives similar to those of the majority and proposing that successful
minorities will not help reduce discrimination because they achieved success by
conforming).
61 Id. at 1658.
62 See id. at 1677-91.
63 Id. at 1691.
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after-work socialization tends to be same race. 64 They conclude
that racial types that race their way to the top of the corporate
hierarchy are not likely to exercise racial agency to lift others as
they climb.65 The acquiring of board seats by persons of color will
result in cross-racial learning and eventually to the amelioration
of unconscious discrimination, but Carbado and Gulati conclude
that successful minorities cannot be expected to do the anti-
discrimination work that law has performed, albeit imperfectly. 66
B. Paid Performance
A further issue is that structural barriers to board
participation may exist from director compensation practices. A
considerable amount has been written on the incentive effects of
CEO and other executive compensation structure7. 67  If the
structure is geared toward maximizing short-term return, then
there is incentive for officers to adopt strategies that maximize
that return without necessarily balancing long-term value and
sustainable strategies. The same incentive effects discourage
investing in a more diverse workplace once the statutory
minimum of human rights compliance is met, as dollars out of
shareholders' pockets today are dollars out of the CEO's
compensation package.
The compensation of directors may also create barriers to
diverse boards. In Canada, directors are frequently considered to
effectively represent shareholder interests if they themselves
hold shares, as it creates incentives to devote the time and
energy to proper oversight and to take remedial action where
officers are engaged in shirking or other problematic behavior. A
number of Canada's largest corporations require a specified level
64 Id. at 1668-72. They define tokenism as the situation whereby the firm hires
a small number of persons of color and does little to integrate them into firm culture,
with the institutional effect of legitimizing the existence of a predominantly white
workplace and providing the firm with a defense against discrimination. Id. at 1668-
69.
65 Id. at 1692-93.
66 Id. at 1693.
67 See, e.g., Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate
America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARiz. L. REV. 493, 493-95 (2005) (urging Corporate
America to fix executive compensation on its own, without increased governmental
regulation); see also Roger L. Martin, Taking Stock, 81 HARV. Bus. REV., Jan. 2003,
at 19, 19 (concluding that compensating corporate managers with stock and stock
options is ineffective because it creates an incentive for managers to increase the
expectations of future earnings, but not actual earnings).
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of shareholdings to signal that commitment, often five to six
times the annual director fees. 68  This can create financial
barriers to board participation that is representative of gender
and race. This requirement clearly has a class component to it,
as a potential director must have sufficient assets or income to
participate on the board.
Canadian corporations are moving away from stock options
as a form of director compensation, because there is no capital at
risk and stock options tend to focus director attention on short-
term value, to the detriment of long-term investor interests.69
Deferred share units ("DSUs") or shareholdings are viewed as
better incentives for directors to focus on long-term
sustainability. The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance
suggests as best practice that directors be required to own the
equivalent of five years' annual fees in the form of shares or
DSUs after five years on the board.70 While this does not require
assets up front, it assumes that the director has sufficient
resources and income to work on the corporate board for five
years without any immediate compensation, again, restricting
the class of people from whom directorships can be drawn. This
has a disproportionate effect on women and persons of color who
have historically fewer assets and lower income. While the
notion of aligning director interests with shareholder interests
through shareholdings may well promote a level of diligence, it
also results in a very narrow set of perspectives brought to the
board table.71
68 See CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 27, at 24 app.1
(2005) (noting that both the Bank of Montreal and the Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce require directors to hold six times the value of the annual director
retainer in company stock; TransCanada PipeLines Limited requires five times the
amount of shares as the director retainer).
69 See id. at 9-10 (explaining that "[s]tock options are an inappropriate form of
compensation for the directors of large and established corporations"); Martin, supra
note 67, at 19 (stating that "[m]otivating managers with company stock can do
damage on a grand scale, encouraging them to pursue strategies that fatten their
wallets at shareholders' expense"). The Coalition advocates that shares should be
granted to directors at market value or in the form of deferred share units ("DSUs"),
which are bookkeeping entries that are equivalent in value to a common share with
dividend rights. It observes that DSUs are maintained until the director retires, at
which time the director can claim the shares or the cash equivalent of their face
value. See CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 27, at 9.
70 Id. at 10.
71 See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (explaining how corporate
boards are nearly homogeneous in race, gender, and values).
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Directors could monitor compliance with human rights law
and with corporate policies on diversity and human rights, and
executives and senior managers could have a component of their
compensation based on their success in implementing and
managing diversity. Given the strong incentive effects in how
compensation is structured, a corporate commitment to human
rights should be reflected in how directors assess management of
the corporation.
C. Board Understudy
Even if there are not qualified women and persons of color in
a particular sector (a highly arguable point), corporate boards
could immediately address board diversity through either
apprenticeship or understudy programs or the creation of board
advisory committees on race and gender.
An understudy program could involve recruiting potential
future board members from diverse groups with diverse
perspectives and committing corporate resources for two years to
have them as non-director members of the corporate board. The
"understudies" could take the same orientation and ongoing
training that board members receive, would attend all board
meetings, receive materials, and informally participate in
discussions. For the understudy period, the individuals would
not have either the ability to vote or the legal liability that one
assumes with a directorship. Confidentiality would be achieved
through contractual arrangements, much as corporations
currently ensure through their contracts with executives.
Insurance and indemnification costs would be limited because
the understudies would at best have normative suasion power,
not real oversight power. While the women, persons of color, and
other understudies are acquiring board-related skills and
experience, they would contribute their insights and perspectives
to board discussions on issues, thus enriching the board's
decision making processes from the initiation of such an
initiative.
This kind of model would also break down information
asymmetries, in terms of both the information diverse members
are exposed to, and the preconceptions by existing directors of
the contributions that diverse board members would make. The
costs to the board for travel and other expenses and an
understudy stipend would likely be relatively small compared to
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the costs already expended on director recruitment services. The
understudy program would provide a roster of highly diverse and
skilled potential directors. The benefits to other corporations
would also be evident, as the understudies would be marketable
to other corporations if their numbers exceeded the board seats
that come open within a 2-5 year period that they are committed
to participating in the processes of the sponsoring corporation.
This would address both the risk of free-riding on the
development of the director pool, while at the same time giving
the sponsoring board the option of not making a full board
appointment. Many other occupations have training,
apprenticeship, and mentoring type programs. Once the
confidentiality issue is addressed, there is no reason why
directors should not undertake recruitment and training in a
similar manner. Such a program would also signal to investors,
employees, and consumers that the corporate board is innovative
in its strategy to represent the diversity of its client base and
society in general.
A less aggressive option would be to create gender and race
discrimination advisory committees of corporate boards. In some
instances, corporations have hired corporate ombudspersons,
often reporting to the CEO on human rights and similar issues.
While these are important developments, a staff person that is
dependent on corporate officers for continued employment is
unlikely to provide an independent assessment of corporate
activities that may be overtly or systemically discriminatory. An
advisory committee to the board, comprised of union
representatives, consumers, human rights activists, and others,
would provide that independent advice. In order to be effective,
however, the committee would have to have periodic access to the
entire board, and there must be sufficient reporting and follow up
mechanisms to make any input meaningful. Such a committee
could also serve to help identify future board members.
Given the much higher percentage of women directors on
boards of non-profit corporations and Crown corporations (and
possibly persons of color),72 boards of issuing corporations could
72 See Aliza Pilar Sherman, Woman on Board: In the Boardroom, There's Still
Plenty of Room for Women, ENTREPRENEUR, July 1, 2005, at 37 (noting that
Catalyst, a businesswomen's advisory group, discovered only 13.6% of the board
seats on Fortune 500 boards are occupied by women and that ION, the
InterOrganization Network, found that there are more women sitting on nonprofit
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be drawing on these boards for either dual appointments,
understudy programs, or as a representative on an advisory
committee.
These ideas present just two of many options for dealing
with the myth that there are no qualified women and persons of
color ready to step onto Canadian corporate boards. Given their
oversight obligations, any strategies that encourage diversity of
perspective will enable the corporation to fashion strategic
business plans that minimize downside risks and enhance long
term value. This includes not only gender and race
representation, but the perspective of those from different classes
who have encountered different types of problems in dealing with
the corporation as a consumer, a client, a trade supplier, or an
employee.
III. ACT III, SCENE 1: THE DUTY OF CARE OF CANADIAN
CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Efficiency in corporate activity is normatively defined and
shareholder value maximization is the benchmark against which
the conduct of directors is frequently measured. It needs to be
recast away from a purely shareholder wealth maximization
objective to one that maximizes benefits to all those with
investments in the firm. 73 There is now some support for this
notion with a recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada. 74
In late 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada, in determining the
issue of fiduciary obligation for a financially distressed company,
held that the duty of directors and officers under the Canada
Business Corporations Act ("CBCA") does not change when the
corporation is in financial distress and that directors and officers
boards); see also Agnes Meinhard & Mary Foster, Competition or Collaboration?
Preliminary Results of a Survey of Women's Voluntary Organizations 2 (Ctr. for
Voluntary Sector Studies, Working Paper No. 8, 1997), available at
http://www.ryerson.ca/cvss/WP08.pdf (stating that 16% of board seats in voluntary
nonprofit organizations are filled by women).
73 Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 457, 460-61 (2002). I have suggested that once the
normative content of the shareholder wealth maximization paradigm is evident, the
debate regarding corporate governance becomes a matter of justifying one's
normative choices rather than trying to justify interference in the operations of an
allegedly neutral market. Id. at 461-62.
74 See Peoples Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Wise, [2004] S.C.R. 461, 481 (explaining that
"best interests of the corporation' should be read not simply as the 'best interests of
the shareholders"').
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owe their fiduciary duties solely to the corporation at all times. 75
While the judgment leaves a number of unanswered questions for
directors regarding the extent of their obligations, the Court did
make one important finding. It held that the "best interests of
the corporation" should not be read simply as the "best interests
of shareholders" and that from an economic perspective, best
interests of the corporation means maximizing the value of the
corporation, and various factors may be relevant in determining
what directors should consider in soundly managing with a view
to the best interests of the corporation.76  This finding by
Canada's highest court represents a clear departure from
previous case law where a number of courts have equated best
interests of the corporation with shareholder wealth
maximization.7 7 The Court held that in determining "whether
[directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the
corporation, it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a
given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the
interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors,
consumers, governments and the environment."78  The Court
held that observing respect for interests beyond the company's
shareholders does not leave directors open to the charge that
they have failed in their fiduciary duty to the company.
7 9
The Supreme Court held that in some circumstances,
directors owe a duty of care to creditors and other stakeholders
and that the standard is an objective one in that the subjective
motivation of directors will no longer be a factor in determining
whether directors have met their duty of care.80  Expressly
allowing directors to take account of prevailing socio-economic
75 For a full discussion, see Janis Sarra, Canada's Supreme Court Rules No
Fiduciary Obligation Towards Creditors on Insolvency: Peoples Department Stores
v. Wise, 15 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. (forthcoming 2006). The Court did find that
directors owe a duty of care to creditors, but no fiduciary obligation. The judgment
changed the standard of assessment of the duty of care to a purely objective test,
enshrined the business judgment rule in Canada, and may have provided greater
access to the oppression remedy for creditors. See Peoples Dep't Stores, [2004] S.C.R.
at 483.
76 Peoples Dep't Stores, [2004] S.C.R. at 481.
77 See, e.g., UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi, Inc., [2002]
D.L.R.4th 496, 529; CW Shareholdings, Inc. v. WIC Western Int'l Commc'ns Ltd.,
[1998] O.R.3d 755, 768; Alberta Ltd. v. Producers Pipelines, Inc., [1991] Sask. R. 81,
101.
78 Peoples Dep't Stores, [2004] S.C.R. at 482.
79 See id. at 481 (citing Teck Corp. Ltd. v. Millar [1972] D.L.R.3d 288, 314)).
8o See id. at 492.
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issues and stakeholder interest was also an important
observation by the Court.81 Yet any potential increase in access
to claims based on the duty of care is tempered considerably by
the low threshold set by the Court for deference to business
judgments and the entrenchment for the first time in Canada of
the business judgment rule.8 2 "Directors . . . will not be held to be
in breach of the duty of care.., if they act[ed] prudently and on a
reasonably informed basis. The decisions ... must be reasonable
business decisions in light of all the circumstances about which
the directors ... knew or ought to have known."8 3  This
observation will be a critical part of determining whether there is
any real enhancement of director oversight.
Arguably, the duty of care could encompass an obligation to
ensure processes in place for compliance with human rights law
and corporate codes of conduct. Cheryl Wade has observed that
large settlements in the United States for race discrimination
reflect what should already be occurring under directors' duty of
care to ensure that shareholder profits are not reduced as a
result of non-compliance with anti-discrimination law.8 4
The apparent opening up of the duty of care under Canadian
law also creates potential for investor claims of breach of
directors' duty of care to ensure that programs and monitoring
are in place to comply with human rights laws and company
diversity policies. To date, no such actions have, to the author's
knowledge, ever been filed in Canada. Canada prides itself on
having a better record than its sister nation to the south in terms
of human rights, employment and labor standards, and
environmental and occupational health and safety. Remedial
legislation in all of these areas is stronger, and enforcement more
aggressive. In the environmental field, directors and officers are
more likely to implement environmental protection and
remediation, because courts and statutes have allocated a portion
of personal liability on corporate decision makers where they
have not been duly diligent in their oversight and monitoring
activities. Arguably, the same case could be made for directors
that are not duly diligent in their oversight of human rights
related corporate activities. The Supreme Court judgment opens
81 See id. at 463.
82 See id. at 492.
83 Id. at 493.
84 Wade, supra note 7, at 1463.
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up possibilities for holding directors accountable for failure to be
duly diligent in ensuring compliance with human rights laws.
Yet the Supreme Court's recasting of the duty of care away
from a purely shareholder remedy is not sufficient, in itself, to
address the issues posed by race, gender, and class in corporate
activity. While such a discussion is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is important to note that current corporate law
reinforces pre-existing notions of ownership, which have
historically been an imbalance in property relations by gender
and race as a result of powerful political, cultural, economic, and
political norms. Existing governance systems continue to shift
property to those already propertied, primarily white males,
without any express acknowledgment that there are
distributional consequences to the existing corporate paradigm.
The shifting of any control rights or imposing a stronger duty of
care towards diverse stakeholders will be resisted as having
distributional effects, without acknowledging the historical
discriminatory distribution of property and wealth in Anglo-
America.8 5
IV. PLAYING TO THE AUDIENCE-SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
While institutional shareholders in the United States have
supported board diversity in order to enhance board
independence and the contributions of diverse perspectives and
skills,8 6 such diversity has not been championed by Canadian
institutional investors in the same way. The Canadian Coalition
for Good Governance is an organization of institutional investors
that together manage $500 billion in assets.8 7 The Coalition is
dedicated to working with boards, particularly the boards of
corporations on the S&P/TSX Composite Index, to adopt
progressive governance practices that are aimed at enhancing
long-term investment returns and reducing governance risk. It
has published what it considers minimum standards and best
85 See Sarra, supra note 73, at 462-63.
86 See, e.g., CA. PUB. EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORE PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES 6 (2005), available at http://www.calpers-
governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-principles.pdf;
TIAA-CREF, Policy Statement on Corporate Governance, http://www.tiaa-
cref.org/pubs/html/governancepolicy/boarddirectors.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2005).
87 See CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 27, at 3.
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practices.88 While its model governance practices are aimed at
ensuring high quality directors with integrity, competence, high
ethical standards, financial accreditation or literacy, career
experience and expertise relevant to the corporation's business
purpose, and active listening, communicating, and influencing
skills, there is no mention in its guidelines of diversity of
perspective or background.8 9  One footnote observes that in
building an "evergreen list" of future board candidates with
needed talents to fill vacancies, a UK report emphasized
recruiting outside the "old boys" network. 90 Yet, that is the only
reference to any need for diversity. The Coalition suggests that
directors are responsible for setting the corporation's overall
vision and long-term direction, including risk and return
expectations and non-financial goals. 91 Hence it recognizes that
oversight requires skilled insights, but does not identify how
current board selection practice may prevent realization of this
goal.
While Canadian institutional investors have not championed
board diversity, there is some movement, as evidenced by 2005
proxy voting guidelines. The Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan,
managing $85 billion in assets, indicates in its proxy voting
guidelines that "diversity in experience, education, attitudes and
background" are important, although it does not expressly
mention gender or race. 92 It also notes that effective governance
should be measured by the quality of advice and counsel when
the board has a diverse composition. 93 This is an important
point. If diversity means that all directors do not have CEO
experience, then the quality of professional support to the board
becomes critically important, so that diverse perspectives can be
brought to informed decision making. The Ethical Funds
88 Id. at 5.
89 Id. at 7-8.
90 Id. at 8 (citing TYSON REPORT); see also THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 6 (2003), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/
pagemanager/frc/combinedcodefinal.pdf (noting that "[tjo ensure that power and
information are not concentrated in one or two individuals, there should be a strong
presence on the board of both executive and non-executive directors").
91 See CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 27, at 18.
92 ONT. TEACHERS' PENSION PLAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE IS GOOD BUSINESS:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES AND PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 14 (2005),
available at http://www.otpp.com/web/website.nsf/web/corpgov_12_O4eng/$FILE/
Corpgovjl2_04ENG.pdf.
93 Id. at 15.
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Company, with $1.5 billion in assets under management, in its
2005 proxy voting guidelines, specifies that it supports proposals
to encourage companies to pursue diversity on corporate boards
that "mirror[s] the diversity of the workforce and society" thereby
bringing a variety of qualified viewpoints to corporation decision
making.9 4 It will "vote against the members of a nominating
committee if there does not appear to be at least one woman or
minority director on the board."
95
Institutional shareholders have rarely engaged corporations
on a wider range of social issues such as gender and racial
diversity or discrimination, in the same way that U.S. funds have
engaged. Many pension funds in Canada delegate responsibility
for voting to fund managers, who have incentives to vote with
corporate officers and hence are unlikely to independently
advocate change absent some pressure by their constituencies,
the beneficial owners.96 The Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan
proxy voting guidelines indicate the tension it sees in voting on
issues broadly classified as social responsibility issues.
Our fiduciary duty is to obtain the highest return for the plan
commensurate with acceptable levels of risk. Consequently,
non-financial considerations cannot take precedence over risk
and return considerations in the management of the pension
fund. Nevertheless, we believe that careful consideration of
social responsibility issues by companies and their boards will
enhance long-term shareholder value. We encourage companies
to develop policies and practices to address issues of social
responsibility that are relevant to their businesses, including:
. the environmental impact of the company's products and
operations;
. the impact of the company's strategies and decisions on the
communities and constituencies directly affected by its products
and operations;
" fair labour practices for all segments of the population; and
" employee training and development.
Our attention to these issues is not meant to be a substitute for
the duties and actions that are the responsibility of regulatory
94 ETHICAL FUNDS CO., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 13 (2005), available at
http://www.ethicalfunds.com/pdf2/sri/proxy-voting-guidelines.pdf.
95 Id.
96 See Ronald B. Davis, The Enron Pension Jigsaw: Assembling Accountable
Corporate Governance by Fiduciaries, 36 U.B.C. L. REV. 541, 566-67 (2003)
(explaining that fund managers have little incentive to take any action to further the
employee-beneficiaries' interests).
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agencies or the laws of the country in which a company
operates.
Our focus is to obtain the highest return and to encourage the
adoption of socially responsible policies and practices by
companies as a means of maximizing long-term shareholder
value.
We clearly recognize that to effectively manage a corporation,
directors and management must consider not only the interests
of shareholders, but the interests of employees, customers,
suppliers, creditors, and the community as well. However,
corporate officers and directors must fulfill their fiduciary duty
and recognize that their first priority is to the owners of their
corporation, its shareholders.
Stakeholder proposals often demand that directors consider the
effects of their decisions on numerous other corporate
constituencies at the expense of the company's shareholders.
They are inconsistent with the directors' primary fiduciary duty
and may serve to undermine the long-term value of the
company. In our view, directors should not be put in the
position of having to give equal or more consideration to the
interests of "stakeholders" than to the long-term interests of
shareholders. 97
A. Enter the Regulators, Stage Left
Canadian securities regulators have now entered the market
for corporate governance, driven in part by the corporate and
securities scandals in the United States, the subsequent
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities and
Exchange Commission's aggressive move into the area of
corporate governance and increased enforcement. Given the
number of large Canadian-based issuers that are cross-listed on
U.S. exchanges and the existence of the Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System ("MJDS"), there is considerable pressure on
regulators to ensure that- securities law requirements in Canada
continue to align with the U.S. requirements in order that
Canadian-based issuers have continued cost effective and timely
access to U.S. capital markets. "Recent initiatives by Canadian
securities regulators with respect to corporate governance can be
categorized as both investor confidence and investor participation
97 ONT. TEACHERS' PENSION PLAN, supra note 92, at 4, 40.
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measures."98 There are a series of reforms to securities law that
are aimed at increasing the transparency of issuer decisions
regarding effective governance and enhancing the participation
rights of security holders.99  These reforms have increased
codification of governance, including audit committee
requirements and officer certification. However, there are no
requirements, nor is there any discussion of, the potential
benefits of board diversity.100
Recent legislative amendments have opened up the
governance process by allowing increased communication among
security holders without activating the proxy solicitation
requirements.101  Corporate law amendments in 2001 were
aimed, in part, at enhanced shareholder participation, including
permitting corporations to have electronic shareholder meetings
and voting through the use of new technologies, new provisions
for shareholder proposals, and revised proxy rules aimed at
facilitating shareholder communication.1 0 2  The amendments
removed some impediments to shareholder communication, thus
98 See MARY G. CONDON ET AL., SECURITIES LAW IN CANADA: CASES &
COMMENTARY 391 (2005) at 391-432. For example, Multilateral Instrument 52-109,
which became effective for all jurisdictions except British Columbia on March 30,
2004, provides for mandatory certification of disclosure in issuers' annual and
interim financial statements. The CEO and CFO must each certify that their issuer's
financial statements fairly present the financial condition of the issuer for the
relevant time period. See Ont. Sec. Comm'n, Multilateral Instrument 52-109:
Certification of Disclosure in Issuers' Annual and Interim Filings, available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/CurrentlPart5/rule-20040326-52-
109-cert.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
99 See, e.g., Ont. Sec. Comm'n, Multilateral Instrument 52-108: Auditor
Oversight, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/
Part5/rule 20040326 52-108-aud-oversight.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). One
positive change is a new national instrument on disclosure that requires mutual
funds to disclose their proxy voting guidelines and voting records. See Ont. Sec.
Comm'n, National Instrument 81-106: Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure pts.
10.1, 10.21, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/
Part8/rule_20050603_81-106_if-cont-disc.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
100 See Ont. Sec. Comm'n, National Policy 58-201: Corporate Governance
Guidelines, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/RegulationlRulemaking/Current/
Part5/rule_20050415_58-201_gov-practices.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
101 The proxy solicitation provisions are also designed to provide an alternative
to "exit," that is, selling shares if security holders are dissatisfied with the
governance of the company.
102 Canada Business Corporations Regulations SOR/2001-512 (Can.), C. Gaz.
2001.1.2683 at 2692, available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/
2 0 0 1/ 2 0 0 11205/
pdflg2-13525.pdf (explaining in Part 5 that electronic shareholder meetings are
allowed); see also Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, §§ 131-32
(1985).
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promoting shareholder activism and accountability.1 0 3
Solicitation has now been redefined to allow broader
communication without triggering dissident proxy requirements,
including a public announcement by a shareholder of how the
shareholder intends to vote and the reasons for that decision, or a
communication for the purposes of obtaining the number of
shares required for a shareholder proposal.' 04  The new
communication provisions will allow shareholders that were
previously distanced by proxy solicitation prohibitions to
communicate and build support for particular governance
strategies. If human rights are on investors' list of preferences,
these changes may open up the governance debate in respect to
board and workplace diversity.
The majority of Canadian citizens are now invested in the
capital markets, although the majority of these investments are
through pension plans, where women and racial minorities have
little or no voice in the exercise of votes.'0 5 Women and many
racial minorities earn less than similarly situated men and thus
have far less disposable cash to either undertake equity
investment or take advantage of employee stock ownership
programs. The advent of book-entry or book-based securities
record systems also means that the Canadian Depository for
Securities and other depositories are frequently the registered
holder of share certificates, creating a risk of diminution of
smaller investors' ability to exercise "voice." The introduction of
103 See Janis Sarra, The Corporation as Symphony: Are Shareholders First
Violin or Second Fiddle?, 36 U.B.C. L. REV. 403, 403 (2003) (focusing "on
shareholders and whether the current regime affords them adequate protection and
participation rights").
104 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 147 (1985). A person
may now solicit proxies without sending a dissident's proxy circular, if the total
number of shareholders whose proxies are solicited is fifteen or fewer. Id. ch. C-44, §
150. There is a further exception for solicitation of support by "public broadcast,"
where a person may solicit proxies without sending a dissident's proxy circular if the
solicitation is conveyed by public broadcast, speech, or publication. Id. ch. C-44, §
150(1.1)-(1.2). The Regulations further codify solicitation, specifying that solicitation
does not include a public announcement that is made by a speech in a public forum
or a press release, an opinion, a statement, or an advertisement provided through a
broadcast medium or by a telephonic, electronic, or other communication facility, or
appearing in a newspaper, a magazine, or other publication generally available to
the public. Canada Business Corporations Regulations SOR/2001-512 (Can.), C. Gaz.
2001.1.2683 at 2706, available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2001/20011205/
pdflg2-13525.pdf.
105 See ETHICAL FUNDS CO., supra note 94, at 13 (addressing the problem of
board diversity).
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computerized purchase and sale records, and the use of
centralized depositories has assisted capital markets and reduced
the transaction costs of trading. Yet there have been problems
with the ability of beneficial shareholders whose shares are
registered under the depository to exercise voting rights and
survive challenges to the validity of proxies when they attempt to
vote on their own behalf.10 6 The recent National Instrument on
Communication with Beneficial Owners of Securities of a
Reporting Issuer is aimed at increasing shareholder
communication, allowing for enhanced delivery of documents via
the internet and facilitating the use of electronic communication
in the proxy solicitation process. 10 7 It is likely to counter balance
some of the deterrent effects of the registry system in regard to
shareholder participation, but in itself is not sufficient to address
problems of expressing investor preferences for compliance with
human rights law and corporate diversity policies.
In an effort to harmonize regulatory approaches in Canada
and the United States, the Canadian Securities Administrators
in 2005 promulgated a National Policy on proposed best
corporate governance practices that are based on the NYSE final
corporate governance rules implemented after the U.S. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act came into force. l08 Unlike the NYSE rules that are
mandatory listing standards, however, the Canadian policy is not
prescriptive. 109  It combines voluntary compliance with a
mandatory disclosure requirement in terms of requiring
companies to describe how they meet the objectives of a guideline
if they have not implemented the specific governance standards
suggested. 10  It applies to all reporting issuers, including
business trusts, which are the fastest growing form of corporate
106 See, e.g., Fama Holdings Ltd. v. Powertech Inds., Inc., [1997] B.C.L.R.3d 357;
In re Coral Gold Corp., [1999] B.C.L.R.3d 52; Vella-Zarb v. Canhorn Chem. Corp.,
[1996] O.J. 2495.
107 See Ont. Sec. Comm'n, National Instrument 54-101: Communication with
Beneficial Owners of Securities of a Reporting Issuer, available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule-20041126_54-
101_comm-ben-owners.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (explaining that "[t]he primary
purpose of the Instrument is to ensure that beneficial owners of securities of a
reporting issuer can receive proxy-related materials and provide instructions on how
the securities they beneficially own are to be voted").
1o See Ont. Sec. Comm'n, National Policy 58-201: Corporate Governance
Guidelines, supra note 100.
109 See id. pt. 1.1.
110 See id. pt. 3.9.
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entity in Canada."1 ' Issuers are encouraged to consider the
guidelines in developing their own corporate governance
practices, including: maintaining a majority of independent
directors; adopting a written board mandate that explicitly
acknowledges responsibility for stewardship; developing a set of
corporate governance principles and a written code of business
conduct and ethics; adopting a process for determining what
competencies and skills the board as a whole should have; and
applying this result to the recruitment process for new
directors.11 2 It does not refer to board diversity at all.
Hence, the recent disclosure requirements by Canadian
securities regulators are only a first step. Disclosure is premised
largely on the assumption that investors will act, either through
voice or exit, if the disclosed conduct of the corporation reveals
discriminatory practices. While investors may be able to
diversify their risk, employees, unsecured creditors, and others
may be less able to act on corporate disclosures. Even investors
are limited in their efforts to ameliorate corporate discriminatory
activity through prohibitions on shareholder action based on size
of holdings and length of time as an investor.
B. The Play's the Thing
Derivative suits in the United States have been brought by
shareholders to recover corporate losses that resulted from funds
being expended to settle racial and sexual harassment suits and
losses due to damaged corporate reputation.11 3 Cheryl Wade
suggests that judicial decision making in these instances
prevents real accountability to shareholders when boards permit
discrimination to continue.11 4 A derivative suit alleging director
breach of duty of care in the aftermath of the settlement of the
Texaco racial discrimination suit by 1500 African American
employees was settled, but Wade observes that the managers
who had discriminated and the directors who failed to monitor
did not personally bear any costs. 11 5 Wade suggests that the use
111 See id. pt. 1.2.
112 See id. pts. 3.1, 3.4, 3.8, 3.12, 3.14.
113 See Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women and
People of Color, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 228-30 (2003).
114 See id. at 227-30 (demonstrating that procedural hurdles often render
derivative suits ineffective as well as providing an example of a suit that failed to
make it over these hurdles).
115 Id. at 229-30.
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of the derivative mechanism may be a potentially significant
strategy for improving workplace conditions for workers of color
in that the demand on the board to act may open up a dialogue
and foster settlement of claims, thus providing a mediating
forum for gender and race discrimination.
116
Derivative actions in Canada have not been used in a
manner similar to the Texaco shareholder claim.117 A study of
more than 300 Canadian judgments on derivative actions found
not a single claim in respect to an alleged breach of duty of care
for failing to act on discrimination.1 18 The statutory derivative
action mechanism was enacted to overcome common law barriers
to shareholders bringing complaints on behalf of the corporation
for harms to the corporation where directors and officers failed to
act in the interests of the corporation. The provisions confer
broad discretion on the court to supervise conduct of a derivative
action, and the remedy awarded almost always accrues to the
corporation; hence it is amenable to consider systemic remedies
to lack of managerial oversight of human rights issues. The vast
majority of Canadian derivative actions do not proceed past the
stage of the court granting leave.119 This is because derivative
action remedies are aimed at the delicate balance between
ensuring that those responsible for harms to the corporation are
held accountable for those harms and the court serving a gate
keeping function in that claims should not be used to
inappropriately extract value from the corporation by aggressive
shareholders or other complainants seeking an advantage from
the corporation. The derivative action remedy has both a
remedial and deterrence function, with Canadian courts having
held that the derivative action "helps to guarantee some degree
116 See CHERYL L. WADE, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between
the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 392,
402-03 (2002).
117 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
118 Janis Sarra, Review of the Derivative Action Provisions of the Canadian
Business Corporations Act, Policy Implications and Options: Report to Corporations
Canada (Apr. 30, 2005) (on file with author).
119 This is due, at least in part, to the procedural restrictions placed on these
suits. Canadian corporate statutes require three criteria to be met before a
derivative action can be brought: the complainant must give notice to the directors of
an intention to apply to the court to commence an action if the directors do not bring,
diligently prosecute, or defend an action; the complainant must be acting in good
faith; and it must appear to be in the interests of the corporation that the action be
brought. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44 § 239 (1985).
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of accountability and to ensure that control exists over the board
of directors by allowing shareholders the right to bring an action
against directors if they have breached their duty to the
company. ' 120 Hence, there may be potential for shareholders or
others to bring a derivative action for failure to monitor human
rights compliance, although the costs may be prohibitive given
the existing mechanisms under the human rights remedial
regime.
Another shareholder strategy to press decision makers to
adopt meaningful human rights and diversity programs is the
shareholder proposal. Shareholder proposals are at a nascent
stage in Canada, particularly with respect to human rights
issues. This is because until 2001, under the Canada Business
Corporations Act, shareholders were prohibited from introducing
any proposals that dealt with social issues, and the courts
interpreted the exclusion very broadly.121 With the repeal of
these provisions, proposals could now ask that corporate boards
implement or improve diversity and human rights programs and
that they monitor and report on compliance. A recent report on
the 2005 year-to-date proposals in Canada reported that there
was only one proposal on implementation of human rights
policy,1 22 and one on increasing the gender diversity in senior
positions.1 23 While there were significant numbers of resolutions
on environmental protection and sustainability, human rights
and diversity proposals have yet to become a shareholder
priority. With respect to the two proposals mentioned above,
both were withdrawn because the board opened up a dialogue
with the investors. Hence, shareholder proposals can have a
normative effect of encouraging a corporation to act, even though
they would not be binding on a corporate board, particularly
where the corporation seeks to avoid public debate or
embarrassment. Here there may be considerable potential. Yet
the U.S. experience with shareholder proposals advocating an
end to discrimination is that it can often take years before the
120 Richardson Greenshields of Can., Ltd. v. Kalmacoff, [1995] O.R.3d 577.
121 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 137 (1985).
122 Petro-Canada, seeking reporting on implementation of human rights policy,
filed by Ethical Funds, Inc. and withdrawn. Shareholder Ass'n for Research and
Educ. (SHARE), http://www.share.ca (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
123 Cognos Inc., filed by Real Assets Investment Management, and withdrawn.
Shareholder Ass'n for Research and Educ. (SHARE), http://www.share.ca (last
visited Oct. 28, 2005).
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corporation pays attention, indicating that at best it is a blunt
tool for changing discriminatory corporate practices.
124
One factor that militates against shareholder action is
distance from the corporation's activities that may be
discriminatory. For controlling shareholders, it may be the
problem of class and race for many of the same reasons as they
do not view board diversity as important. For those
shareholdings that are more widely held, shareholders are
frequently beneficial shareholders or have investments in
pension funds and mutual funds, which spread their investment
risks across many corporations. Without being directly invested
or making conscious decisions regarding where their equity
dollars are placed, other than to ensure long term security or
pensions, shareholders are less likely to be aware of
discrimination in a corporate workplace or may feel powerless to
influence policy beyond compliance with law.
V. CHANGING THE SCENE-CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
COSTS
In the Anglo-American conception of corporate activity,
wealth is generated in part by the creation of externalities, those
costs that the corporation does not have to bear and which are
picked up by society in the form of unemployment, social welfare
benefits, and health care costs. The corporation is rewarded for
its creation of externalities because it can shed many real costs
associated with its activities and report greater profits, in turn
paying out greater dividends to shareholders and extracting
increased personal compensation for officers. Absent a
requirement to account for all costs of corporate activity, the
cycle continually repeats itself, causing a further distribution of
wealth in favor of the corporation and its investors. A normative
conception of the corporation that takes account of gender, race,
and class must meet the problem of externalities head-on.
Corporations are currently often free to externalize
numerous costs of decisions that create market inefficiencies, but
which may harm employees, communities, and public welfare.
125
Highly competitive capital markets create pressures to shed
124 See, e.g., Michael S. Markowitz, New York City Employee Pension Fund
Helps Change Cracker Barrel's Bias Policy, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 3, 2004.
125 See Sarra, supra note 73, at 463.
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labor and downsize in order to retain returns to equity investors.
Externalities can have a gender and race effect, as women
workers and workers of color are unable to diversify their risk,
and as "last hired," are likely to be "first fired." Moreover, while
egregious human rights practices at a corporation affect all
workers, it is those with the least economic power, frequently
working class women and workers of color, who are not easily
able to exit the employment relationship. This is frequently due
to the lack of savings or other economic cushions because wages
are low in the first place, and hence these workers do not have
assets to weather even temporary job loss. The inability to exit
can mean that these workers do not have the power to either
bargain for change to workplace practices or the power to file
regulatory complaints and risk job loss from sanctions. While,
technically, Canadian law protects workers from unjust dismissal
due to the filing of a health and safety or human rights
complaint, many people lose their jobs each year for seeking to
enforce their rights. The delay in investigation and enforcement
due to inadequate resources and heavy caseloads hinders the
ability of this protection to be effective. Even where
reinstatement is successful, the problems that were the cause of
the complaint at the outset are often not remedied, and
reinstated workers may face stigma from having sought to
enforce their rights in the first place. While unions in Canada
have been powerful advocates for workers in such situations,
almost 70% of the Canadian workplace is not unionized. 126
Similarly, where a corporation engages in economic activity
that is environmentally harmful, the community often pays for
the effects of that harm, first from direct health effects that are
costly to the Medicare system, and second from the tax dollars
required for remediation when the corporation exits thejurisdiction or goes bankrupt without having remedied its
environmental harms. Those with greater assets may pay their
share of taxes towards such remediation, but they are also better
able to relocate away from hazardous areas that working class
people, particularly women and persons of color, cannot. Women
are also often less mobile because they are single parents and
have care giving obligations. Hence, while the issue of
126 Study: The Union Movement in Transition, THE DAILY, Aug. 31, 2004, at 7,
available at http://statcan.ca/Daily/English/040831/d483lb.htm.
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externalities is a pressing issue for all corporate stakeholders, it
disproportionately affects those who have no power to exit the
corporate relationship and limited power to force corporate
compliance with environmental standards.
There is also an assumption that public law in the form of
social safety nets and legal mechanisms for enforcement of credit
and other claims will protect stakeholder interests. The problem
of externalities has been exacerbated by the dismantling of social
safety nets, such as attacks on employment standards and
regulatory resources, and by labor shedding due to merger
activity or export of corporate productive activity without
adequate public or private resources directed toward retraining,
retooling, and job creation.
How does one take account of externalities? By regulatory
change that requires corporations to internalize the direct costs
of their corporate decisions, through adequate enforcement
resources, and through corporate governance structures that
comply with laws, create a culture of accountability for direct
costs, and recognize the value of diverse interests and
investments in the corporation. Elsewhere I have proposed a
methodology whereby all of the diverse inputs of workers would
be explicitly valued and recognized as claims on the corporation's
assets. 127 When costs and claims on the value of corporate assets
are accounted for, efficiency would be recast, as current
externalities would be internally priced, with the corporation
being required to make different kinds of economic and
production decisions to maximize overall enterprise wealth. One
could create a value that recognizes diversity within corporate
economic activity. This could be measured not only through cost-
savings from civil law discrimination suits in the United States
or damage awards from regulatory prosecution of human rights
violations in Canada, but also from quantifying the value of
human dignity for women and workers of color, the costs of harm
from discrimination, and the costs of equitable pay practices, all
measured to create a new normative definition of efficiency.
128
127 JANIS SARRA, CREDITORS RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS (2003).
128 See Sarra, supra note 73, at 468 (explaining that
"workers ... are ... residual claimants to the value of the firm's assets, yet the
nature of this investment is inadequately accounted for in corporate decision
making .... ").
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VI. STAGE RIGHT-THE MNE
Today, very few large corporations operate purely within
their domestic borders. Within this context, the issue of boarddiversity and reduction of human rights harms must take into
account the international nature of Multinational Enterprises("MNEs"). Globalization poses particular challenges to the
ability of domestic governments to enforce specific human rights
standards, particularly where corporations headquartered in the
nation-state conduct economic activities elsewhere. It is
increasingly evident that domestic law on its own is incapable of
controlling the activities of MNEs, a concern where the
exportation of production activities creates human rights harms.
Moreover, the multinational nature of corporate activity limits
the ability of domestic jurisdictions to tax corporations to
generate revenue necessary to provide social services that could
ameliorate the harms created by those corporations. 129
What will be the long term impact of "regulatory chill" in
terms of both the willingness of MNEs to situate themselves injurisdictions with minimal human rights or labor standards and
the inability of host or home nations to devise laws that protect
their citizens from the harmful effects of unregulated
discriminatory activity?130 MNEs have been implicated in
nations that engage in repressive human rights policies or police
repression in order to engage in productive activities.la1 MNEs
129 See A. Claire Cutler, Private Authority and International Trade Relations:
The Case of Maritime Transport, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS 283, 316 (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999); Ronald B. Davis, InvestorControl of Multi-national Enterprises: A Market for Corporate Governance Based onJustice and Fairness?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS,
supra note 7, at 131, 131; Saskia Sassen, The Spatial Organization of InformationIndustries: Implications for the Role of the State, in GLOBALIZATION: CRITICALREFLECTIONS 33, 33 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996); Celia R. Taylor, A ModestProposal: Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global Age, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 745,784 (explaining that "[t]he cost of compliance with a State's investment regulations
will be factored into any investment decision" and that "[i]nvestors who face
restrictions on equity ownership or on their ability to draw profits realized on fundsinvested in the country are likely to shift those funds to a more receptive country").130 The WTO has suggested that while the direct consequences of increased
regulation may be overstated, regulatory chill may still hinder the competition for
capital globally where some nations attempt to enact stronger domestic
environmental protection policies. See WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE ANDENVIRONMENT (1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp e/
environment e.pdf.
131 See Bennett Freeman, Deputy Assistant Sec'y of State for Democracy,
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have allegedly engaged in human rights violations, activities
harmful to the environment, child labor, anti-unionization
activity, slavery, and dangerous health and safety conditions.
13 2
This has occurred particularly where the host nation is desperate
for the economic activity offered by MNEs.
Unlike developed countries, where there exists a framework
for tempering the unchecked activities of corporations through
human rights law, many countries do not have the infrastructure
to develop or enforce laws addressing the conduct of
multinational enterprises. Moreover, corporate codes of conduct
are aimed at ensuring transparency in governance and financial
reporting, and securities and credit enforcement regimes that
offer effective remedies for investors. 133 While these property
protections are essential to fostering investor confidence and,
consequently, healthy capital markets, they ignore the need to
develop a host of other public policy measures in order to strike
an appropriate balance between wealth creation and the
protection of human rights. The growth of MNE activity across
multiple jurisdictions, and international trade law that facilities
liberalized trade and limits the use of principles such as the
national treatment principle, have diminished the domestic
regulatory capability of the nation-state, raising troubling social
and distributional issues.134 It is important to examine the
specifics of this regulatory diminution.
Human Rights and Labor, Globalization, Human Rights and the Extractive
Industries, Remarks to the Third Warwick Corporate Citizenship Conference (July
10, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/
2000/000710_freeman warwicku.html); see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915,
920 (9th Cir. 2001) (adjudicating the alleged use of force to coerce residents to
construct an oil pipeline); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d
Cir. 2000) (addressing allegations that Shell Nigeria utilized police and military to
quash opposition to its development activity).
132 See Sarra, supra note 73, at 463; Freeman, supra note 131.
133 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., OECD PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 32, 49 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecdl32/18/31557724.pdf [hereinafter ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.]
(stating that "[tihe corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation,
including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the
company").
134 See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE WORLD SOCIAL
SITUATION 2001, at 284, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/277, U.N. Sales No. E.01.IV.5 (2001)
[hereinafter U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS] (explaining that "[als
corporations extend their operations across national boundaries in a global market,
their activities increasingly fall outside the regulatory reach of individual States").
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MNEs are organizations, which, while created in one state,
operate in several states through subsidiary corporate entities
created in each country of operation through contractual links in
supply and delivery chains, and/or through licensing and
franchise agreements.135 As private entities, MNEs are subject to
the national law of the states in which they operate, and may
also have been granted certain rights under treaties between
states-rights that can be enforced in the courts of the applicable
state. 136  Certain treaties also provide for the protection of
investor rights against state action through binding international
arbitration. Arbitration provides a dispute resolution mechanism
for claims against the state by investors claiming that the state's
regulatory or legislative initiatives have harmed their
investments. Thus, a forum exists for private actors to hold
public state actors accountable for decisions that harm equity
investments. In contrast, however, there is no international
forum in which these enterprises can be held accountable for
their actions in breach of fundamental international law and
conventions concerning human rights. 137  International law
assigns this function to the courts of the various states,
exercising their national jurisdiction over activities of the
corporations that originate in, or affect their territory.
There are two issues that arise when dealing with a
subsidiary of an MNE. The first is that a subsidiary has its own
"legal personality," and is the legal entity to which liability will
attach in the first instance. Thus, if there are human rights
abuses, nothing automatically attaches liabilities on to the
parent corporation for the acts of the subsidiary. Given this
structuring of liability, the incentive on the parent corporation is
to leave as few assets in the subsidiary as possible.1 38 This leaves
anyone harmed with the difficult task of establishing direct
liability by claiming that the parent failed to properly supervise
135 See id. at 284, 289.
136 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 133, at 47(describing how employee participation in corporate governance depends on national
laws and practices).
137 See Amnesty Int'l, Responsibilities Have No Borders, http://web.amnesty.org/
web/web.nsf/print/850889294F5FBDDB80256FE70059
63 8 8 (last visited Oct. 18,
2005).
138 See Joseph Valof & Richard Menard, Ethics and Compliance in CorporateAmerica: Will the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Restore Confidence in Wall Street?, at 19(2005), available at http://nanosft.conigc/EthicsandCompliance'pdf
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the subsidiary or vicarious liability for the acts of the
subsidiary. 13 9 Thus, parent corporations have reason to transfer
all of the subsidiary's surplus assets to themselves in order to
limit the loss to the MNE overall. If they are successful in doing
so, they will have lessened constraints on decisions to breach
international human rights norms. Second, the use of unlimited
subsidiaries as the vehicle for corporate activities internationally
means that directors and officers of controlling parent
corporations are not directly liable for the actions of the
subsidiary, even where they act as the controlling mind of that
subsidiary. The construction of domestic liability regimes,
judicial reluctance to draw aside the corporate veil, and the
practice of shifting corporate assets from the subsidiary to the
parent to shield the assets from remedial claims in the host
nation create considerable barriers to MNE accountability for
international human rights harms.
Moreover, there is frequently reluctance of home and/or host
governments to take action against MNEs because of their
importance to the country's economy or because they are
beneficiaries of the company's activities. Hence, while a separate
legal entity has been formed for purposes of economic activity in
the host nation, the host nation may be reluctant to enact
legislation that may protect its citizens during the subsidiary's
value-generating activity in the host nation. This is problematic
because those who are harmed by the MNE's activities frequently
cannot invoke proper standards of conduct or access enforcement
mechanisms in order to redress or prevent harms.
140
The beneficiaries of these trends are the MNEs. The
liberalization of labor markets has meant that in the home state,
the MNE can exert economic pressure to dismantle human rights
standards and make the home nation "more competitive" in the
market in which the MNE has generated the competition.
Failure to accede to these demands results in plant and industry
closures and exportation of the economic activity elsewhere,
where the host nation is so anxious for jobs and economic activity
that it undertakes to allow the corporation to operate relatively
139 See, e.g., Lubbe v. Cape plc, (2000) 4 All E.R. 268, 271 (H.L.) (handling
plaintiffs' allegations that the defendant mining company, as the parent company,
failed to take appropriate steps to ensure proper working practices and 
safety
precautions).
140 See id. at 279-80.
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unfettered. This undermines the effective power of nations to
regulate domestic human rights and social policy.141
Another issue is what corporations have called the political
and cultural sensitivities of the host nation. An example would
be nations where women or particular racial groups are not given
access to employment, or, if they are, their compensation reflects
highly discriminatory practices. Respecting the cultural norms of
the host jurisdiction in such a case runs contrary to international
human rights and is offensive to Canadian law regarding
equality rights. The MNE's continued investment in a host
nation that supports inequitable employment practices results in
the perpetuation of gender and racial discrimination. While
developed nations must be careful not to press for wholesale
importation of their normative conceptions of human rights into
emerging economies, it is appropriate to hold those nations to
international norms set through democratic international efforts.
Socio-cultural differences cannot be used, as they are now, tojustify discriminatory labor practices. Yet, even as international
NGO communities have identified this problem for years,
corporations continue to engage in such global activity relatively
unchecked and unscathed by these debates.
The Alberta Teachers' Retirement Fund, while recognizing
that as a fiduciary under trust law it must put the financial
interests of its beneficiaries first, expressly states that non-
financial criteria should be part of its investment process and
that the evaluation of any particular investment may include
consideration of a number of social factors such as labor relations
and environmental stewardship, where the portfolio managerbelieves, based on available information, that such factors should
be properly considered in assessing the investment's overall risk
and performance.142 Its Proxy Guidelines specify that companies
should be encouraged to adopt and operate within the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development("OECD") Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, where
practicable, including: working within the framework of host
141 See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 134, at 284.
142 See ALTA. TEACHERS' RETIREMENT FUND BD., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 23(2005), available at http://www.atrf.comdownloads/documentloader.aspxid=768.
This may occur "where the portfolio manager believes, based on availableinformation, that such factors should be properly considered in assessing theinvestment's overall risk and performance." Id.
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nations; respecting collective bargaining; elimination of child and
forced labor; ensuring that the operations of enterprises are in
harmony with government policies; strengthening the basis of
mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which
they operate; and enhancing MNEs' contribution to sustainable
development. 143 Given the barriers posed to domestic
government regulation of the conduct of MNEs, this form of
investor activism may assist in addressing some of the issues
canvassed throughout this Article.
Internationally, the Council on Economic Priorities
Accreditation Agency has promulgated an international social
accountability standard, S.A. 8000, aimed at the independent
assessment of corporations' labor and human rights practices.
4 4
The development of international standards, even where they are
non-binding, is a start in trying to expose and remedy some of the
most egregious corporate human rights harms.
CONCLUSION-CURTAIN CALL
Unlike many areas regarding the issue of corporate social
responsibility, the duty of the corporation and its directors and
officers not to permit or authorize discrimination based on race
143 See id. at 24.
144 See Soc. ACCOUNTABILITY INT'L, SA8000 (2001), http://www.sa-intl.org.
SA8000 is based on international workplace norms in the ILO conventions and the
U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Rights of the
Child, which includes: no child or forced labor; provisions for a safe and healthy
work environment through training and a system to detect threats to health and
safety; freedom of association and right to collective bargaining; no discrimination
based on race, caste, origin, religion, disability, gender, sexual orientation, union or
political affiliation, or age; no sexual harassment; and no corporal punishment,
mental or physical coercion, or verbal abuse.
The SA8000 standard and verification system covers all widely-accepted
international labor rights; factory-level management system requirement for
ongoing compliance and improvement; and independent, expert verification of
compliance by independent auditing bodies accredited by SA. Additionally, there
are currently nine organizations accredited to do SA8000 certification. It requires
participation by all key sectors, including workers and trade unions, companies,
socially responsible investors, nongovernmental organizations, and government in
the SA8000 system. This participation is required with the Advisory Board, drafting
and revision of the standard and auditing system, conferences, training, and the
complaints system. Furthermore, companies that join level two of the SA8000
Corporate Involvement Program (CIP) release annual progress reports verified by
SAL. See Soc. Accountability Int'l, Overview of SA8000, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=4 7 3 (last visited Oct. 28,
2005).
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and gender in its employment or provision of services is clear.
Any breach of those duties is contrary to law and serves as a
clear basis for both enforcement by public authorities and legal
action by shareholders. When it comes to the issue of diversity
on the corporation's board, however, interested investors face the
challenge of a lack of transparency concerning criteria and the
use of an "experienced" benchmark that has a discriminatory
effect on both women and persons of color because of their
restricted access to the positions that generate the required
experience. While disclosure of board recruitment criteria and
succession plans is an important first step, the challenge will be
to find a means to contest those plans and criteria that do not
deal with the need for diversity with respect to gender and racial
representation on the board.
In Canada, shareholder proposals challenging the failure to
import diversity on the board may provide a means of
commencing a serious discussion of the issue at certain
corporations. Others may require legal actions or a complaint to
the applicable human rights commission regarding systemic
discrimination in board practices. With respect to MNEs, a
major obstacle to an effective anti-discrimination program is a
shortage of reliable information. Once disclosure is required or
offered by the corporation, securities law could be used to
overcome any misleading information about corporate practices.
At this stage in the development of these issues in Canada, it is
not possible to create a sufficiently dramatic conclusion to the
issue of race and gender in corporate governance. The best one
can do is to rely on the tried and true ending of a television
series-"to be continued."
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